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Abstract 
This article presents a case for transfer mispricing as an argument for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). The argument builds on the position that in order to compensate for 
potential loss of brand image and reputation, Multinational Companies (MNCs) would be 
more socially responsible when they are operating in countries where the legislation and laws 
in place are not effective at identifying and sanctioning transfer mispricing. We first discuss 
the dark side of transfer pricing (TP), next we present the nexus between TP and poverty and 
finally we advance arguments for CSR in transfer mispricing. While acknowledging that TP is 
a legal accounting practice, we argue that in view of its poverty and underdevelopment 
externalities, the practice per se should be a solid justification for CSR because it is also 
associated with schemes that deprive developing countries of capital essential for investments 
in health, education and development programmes. Therefore CSR owing to TP cannot be 
limited to a strategic management approach, but should also be considered as some kind of 
social justice because of associated transfer mispricing practices. We further argue that, CSR 
by multinational corporations could incite domestic companies to comply more willingly with 
their tax obligations and/or engage in similar activities.  Whereas, traditional advocates of 
CSR have employed concepts such as reputation, licence-to-operate, sustainability, moral 
obligation and innovation to make the case for CSR, the present inquiry extends this stream of 
literature by arguing that TP and its externalities are genuine justifications for CSR. We 
consolidate our arguments with a case study of Glencore and the mining industry in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.   
 
JEL Classification: F20; H20; M14; O11 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Transfer pricing; Extreme poverty  
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1. Introduction  
 Transfer pricing (TP) is a process by which commodities are traded between legal 
entities or subsidiaries within a corporation. It consists of setting the price at which goods and 
services are sold by one subsidiary to another. For instance, if a subsidiary corporation sells 
commodities to another subsidiary, the cost of the commodities sold is transferred to the 
buying subsidiary as the transfer price. Some of these subsidiaries with legal entities that are 
within the control of a parent company include branches as well as corporations that are 
majority or wholly owned by the parent establishment. Within a broader framework of 
globalisation, TP can be employed as a method of allocating profits (or losses) before taxes to 
various nations where a multinational corporation does business. In a nutshell, TP is the 
outcome of setting prices among various branches within the same corporation.  
 In principle, TP should be consistent with either what the buyer would independently 
pay or what the seller would independently charge. Unfortunately, whereas unrealistic price 
transfers among subsidiaries does not affect the corporation or multinational in overall terms, 
TP becomes an issue for taxing authorities within a government when the accounting practice 
is used to (i) increase profits in countries of low tax jurisdictions (or low income taxes) and 
(ii) decrease profits in countries with high tax jurisdictions (or high income taxes). Given that 
tax havens are in the former category, TP is a principal mechanism for tax avoidance and the 
shifting of profits.  
There is a consensus in the literature that corporations need to cater for some of the 
needs of communities in which they operate (Asongu, J.J; 2007). According to the narrative, 
the act by corporations of going beyond the delivery of commodities to address some of the 
core demands of society has been acknowledged as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
According to Asongu, J.J
1
, there are four main traditional arguments for CSR, namely, the: 
brand image (or reputation), ethical (or moral), legal (or licence-to-operate) and sustainability 
arguments.  
 Over the past decades, the presence of Multinational Companies (MNCs) in 
developing countries has increased the debate as  to what extent MNCs should invest in social 
amenities in communities in which they operate (Sinder et al., 2003; Matten & Moon, 2004; 
Valentine & Fleischman, 2008). This debate has been inflamed by evidence on the role of 
                                                          
1
 There are two authors with last names as Asongu used in this study, namely: Asongu, J.J and Asongu, S.A. 
Hence, the interested reader should not construe the recurrence of Asongu as citations from one person.  
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globalisation in developing economies and implications for human development (Asongu, 
S.A; 2013a).  
It is important to devote some space to discussing the connection between 
globalisation and concerns about unbalanced development. This is essentially because transfer 
pricing, while a rational accounting practice that is consistent with the challenges of 
globalisation, has also contributed to rational asymmetric development: “refers to unfair 
practices of globalisation adopted by advanced nations to the detriment and impoverishment 
of less developed countries” (Asongu, S.A; 2015, p. 14). Insights into how globalisation is 
linked to rational asymmetric development have been abundantly documented in the 
literature, notably: (i) Stiglitz (2007, p. 85),  “The average European cow gets a subsidy of $2 
a day; more than half of the people in the developing world live on less than that.  It appears 
that it is better to be a cow in Europe than to be a poor person in a developing country……  
Without subsidies, it would not pay for the Unites States to produce cotton; with them, the 
United States is, as we have noted, the world's largest cotton exporter”; (ii) the ‘Bad 
Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism’ of Chang (2008); 
(iii) Mshomba (2011) with perspectives on how policies of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) are skewed to the detriment of some developing regions and (iv) Asongu, S.A (2015) 
on the spirit of African poverty.  
It is reasonable to infer that the above narratives are evolving partly because 
Multinational Companies (MNCs) are failing in their role as good corporate citizens. This is 
essentially because whereas the spirit of capitalism is motivating MNCs in their ever 
increasing quests to boost profits, civil societies of countries in which they operate are 
becoming less tolerant of MNCs that are failing to address their social responsibilities (Branco 
& Rodrigues, 2006; Osabuohien et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). One recurrent mechanism via 
which MNCs are evading their responsibilities towards countries in which they operate is tax 
evasion through TP (Sikka, 2010). While acknowledging that TP is a necessary and 
indispensible practice in the era of globalisation, this article argues that TP per se should also 
be a solid justification for more CSR because the practice by definition enables underlying 
MNCs to surreptitiously evade their tax obligations. In essence, TP is most often associated 
with transfer mispricing. Therefore, CSR owing to TP cannot be limited to a strategic 
management approach, but should also be considered as some form of social justice because 
of associated transfer mispricing practices.  
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 Whereas, traditional advocates of CSR have employed concepts such as reputation, 
licence-to-operate, sustainability and moral obligation to make the case for CSR, recently 
there has been growing emphasis on other forms of arguments for CSR, inter alia: innovation 
(Asongu, J.J. 2007). The present inquiry extends this stream of literature by arguing that 
because TP is inherently associated with transfer mispricing, the practice of TP should 
naturally be a genuine justification for CSR. In this light, we take care in distinguishing this 
form of CSR from good works or charitable donations. 
 We devote space to clarifying transfer mispricing as an argument for CSR. Typically, 
arguments for CSR can be made on three broad grounds. (i) CSR is beneficial to the 
corporation (e.g. in improving the corporation’s finances and reputation). (ii) Corporations 
have moral obligations to operate in ways that are broadly beneficial to society and not simply 
to create returns for stockholders and (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii).  
Regardless of on what grounds the corporation stands, two main perspectives are 
apparent. First, eliminating TP is not an argument for CSR, but rather is a means for 
achieving CSR; one means among many that a firm might implement. For example, as a part 
of a CSR programme, a firm might undertake a series of infrastructure improvements in the 
countries in which it operates. This would be a means of accomplishing its CSR goals. 
Second, in a like manner, eliminating transfer mispricing would also be a means of achieving 
CSR goals, in this case by reducing the negative externalities of mispricing. But these 
beneficial consequences are not per se an argument for CSR. 
In the light of the above, the argument in this study neither builds on the eliminating of 
TP nor on the eliminating of transfer mispricing. The former cannot be eliminated because it 
is a legal accounting practice and the latter cannot be eliminated because poor countries do 
not have proper legislation and laws in place for the purpose. Therefore, whereas neither TP 
nor transfer mispricing should directly be an argument for CSR, the indirect connection 
between transfer mispricing and CSR is that most poor countries lack proper legislation and 
laws to monitor and sanction transfer mispricing. Hence, in the absence of effective laws and 
legislations that oversee TP practices by MNCs, it is very likely that MNCs will not consider 
transfer mispricing as illegal because the laws in place are not effective at identifying and 
sanctioning it.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses linkages between 
transfer mispricing, extreme poverty and CSR.  Here, we first discuss transfer mispricing as 
the dark side of TP, then argue about the linkages between TP and poverty before finally 
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presenting the case for CSR in transfer mispricing. Section 3 presents practical insights with a 
case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining industry and Glencore Plc. We 
conclude with Section 4.  
 
2. Transfer Mispricing, Extreme Poverty and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
2.1 The negative side of transfer pricing (TP) 
The negative side of TP is obviously ‘transfer mispricing’ which has been documented 
to be linked to tax avoidance and retention of wealth (Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Asongu, S.A 
2016).  According to this stream of the literature, TP is a legitimate accounting practice which 
has gained more prominence with the advent of globalisation because the operations of 
corporations extend beyond national borders with different taxation regimes and regulations. 
In essence, the ever growing quest to increase company cash flows, profits and goals of 
marketing, among others, has also prompted underlying companies with multinational  
position to adopt measures of cost performance and accounting for taxable profits that are of 
questionable business ethics, even by conservative standards. Within this framework, MNCs 
tailor cost- and overhead-allocation schemes that  enable them to transfer commodities to 
various subsidiaries/branches. 
It is important to note that some discretion is enjoyed by companies which engage in 
TP owing to the subjective features in mechanisms of cost and overhead allocation. Hence, 
companies can assign commodities to specific geographic regions  so as to increase profits 
and keep their taxes low. The basic idea in the TP strategy consists of allocating higher profits 
to low-tax jurisdictions and higher costs to  high-tax jurisdictions.  
Whereas TP can enable corporations to limit the downsides of double taxation, abuse 
of the practice is increasing and it is being employed by virtually all MNCs to shift profits 
(Baker, 2005). According to Ernst and Young (2005), TP is a very useful instrument for tax 
avoidance. Moreover, Ernst and Young (2006) have also established that the practice is the 
most important concern in international taxation. The above TP practices obviously have 
negative externalities on tax incomes, public service delivery and living standards in countries 
with relatively higher rates of corporate taxation, especially low income economies.  
According to Asongu, S.A (2016), the strength of MNCs is being increasingly 
solidified with the spirit of capitalism such that microstates are increasingly taking precedence 
over nation states which are competing for investment needed for employment and taxable 
income. This unfortunate scenario is that in this competition investment and profits are 
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delivered to nation states and micro states respectively. Consistent with the narrative, TP 
schemes are also providing an enabling environment for the proliferation of microstates which 
are commonly known as offshore financial centres or ‘tax havens’.  
In light of the above, low-end taxation or microstates have been growing substantially 
(Sikka, 2010).Microstates have very small populations and hence less public expenditure is 
needed for public commodities and services. Some microstates are even tax-free and therefore 
do not have much regard for mispriced profits that are declared within their jurisdictions. It is 
important to put this point into perspective by articulating the growing depth of activities by 
MNCs in microstates. First, according to Sikka and Willmott (2010), microstates are 
witnessing the birth of over 200000 new enterprises on a yearly basis. Baker (2005) claims 
that there were approximately 3,000,000 corporations registered in microstates by the year 
2000. Notable examples include: (i) the Cayman and British Virgin Islands accounting for 
respectively 3389 and 182 companies for every 100 inhabitants; (ii) a single building in the 
Cayman Island accounting for approximately 19000 companies and (iii) about 15000 
corporations registered in  Sark Island that is host to only 574 residents (UK Home Office, 
1998).  
It is important to note that the above microstates are also associated with developed 
countries. These more advanced nations have the legislative authority to provide a business 
environment that is favourable to MNCs, which are in constant search of obscure 
administrative structures: imposition of low/no taxes, preservation of secrecy and less 
stringent regulations. The above conditions are conducive  to global tax avoidance schemes 
and transfer mispricing mechanisms. It is therefore unsurprising that whereas only about 50 
percent of transactions from global trade are traceable to offshore financial centers, these 
underlying tax havens constitute only about 3 percent of global GDP. Moreover, according 
Sikka and Willlmott (2010), whereas microstates make-up only about 1.2 percent of the 
world’s population, they represents about 26 percent of assets and 31 percent of net profits  of 
the United States MNCs.  
Given the above stylized facts, it is apparent that globalization is engendering novel 
trends in international taxation by MNCs (Asongu, S.A. 2016). According to Sikka and 
Willmott (2010), under the pressure of territorial juridical constraints, MNCs have been 
engineering mechanisms of tax avoidance by means of special purpose entities, negotiating 
trust and joint ventures and establishing subsidiaries as well as affiliates that enable them to 
manipulate asymmetries in taxation systems around the world. It follows that worldwide 
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production is increasingly engendering novel and entrenched networks of TP mechanisms 
which are being masterfully developed by MNCs to shift taxes to microstates,  and so  avoid  
them in countries where their mainstream operations are conducted. What is also striking is 
that the inherent complexity, scale and strength of globalization is facilitating both the good 
and bad sides of TP. Accordingly, production and distribution networks are progressively 
complex, notably: (i) national companies are in a permanent quest for transnational and 
multinational profiles and (ii) foreign companies are at liberty to either jointly enterprise with 
local corporations or establish new companies under different jurisdictions.  
The above scenarios illustrate the case of global trade that has increased international 
corporate legitimacy and by so doing has enhanced the ability of MNCs to introduce ‘tax 
avoidance’ TP schemes. There is a wealth of literature with evidence of MNCs manipulating 
international taxation privileges. Tanzi (2000) has documented how tax administrators are 
deeply engaged in transfer mispricing. According to Sikka and Willmott (2010) and Asongu, 
S.A (2016), multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) are increasingly concerned with the 
plethora of issues in national taxation that have emerged in relation to transfer mispricing by 
MNCs, namely issues surrounding: fixed costs, trademark valuations, loans and patents.  
Whereas the poverty externalities of such schemes may not be so apparent in 
developed nations, poor countries (especially resource-rich nations) are more likely to suffer, 
given that public goods and services are still substantially absent (Borkowski, 1997). 
Furthermore, developing countries are more vulnerable than developed to some TP practices 
like illicit capital flight (Asongu, S.A.2016).   
 
2.2 Linking transfer pricing (TP) to underdevelopment  
 
 We have already emphasised that while TP is a legitimate accounting practice because 
it is needed to distribute profits to various jurisdictions, transfer mispricing which is also a 
commonly associated practice leads to underdevelopment in countries with high corporate tax 
jurisdictions, essentially because of shortage of taxable income that is needed for the delivery 
of public goods and services (Asongu, S.A.,2015, 2016).  
 The unfortunate link between transfer mispricing, losses in tax revenues and 
underdevelopment in high-tax nations has consistently been deplored by renowned policy 
makers and economists who have reached a consensus in acknowledging that, in its current  
form, the international taxation system is inequitable and repulsive (see Walsh, 2015). For 
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example Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has qualified as ‘repulsive, inequitable and 
inefficient’ the manner in which MNCs operate nationally when their capital is global. Hence, 
according to him, these MNCs have “free rein to move their money around to the low-cost 
(tax) jurisdictions” (Walsh, 2015). Stiglitz further posits that this scenario has substantially 
deprived developing countries of capital essential for investments in health, education and 
development programmes. He further claims that “it undermines the social and economic 
fiber of a country”.  
 In order to substantiate the above narratives, we present some statistics and stylize 
facts  in the paragraphs that follow. Given that capital flight is one of the main consequences 
of TP (Donnelly, 2015), recent estimates show that the stock of capital in some poor regions 
(e.g Africa) would have been 60 percent higher had TP and illicit funds been kept on the 
continent. Moreover, the corresponding Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase is estimated 
to have been 15 percent  higher had illicit capital flight been mitigated. On the basis that 
absolute pro-poor
2
 growth is a consequence of GDP growth, the connection between TP and 
poverty becomes apparent. According to Donnelly (2015), commercial corporations 
contribute to about 65 percent of illicit capital flows. Furthermore, it was suggested  that 
deliberate over- and under-invoicing of trade activities represented approximately 67.4 
percent of illegal capital outflows between 2003 and 2012. Donnelly goes on to emphasize 
about 60 billion USD are  lost annually to TP-related activities like illicit capital flight.   
According to the Donnelly, illicit capital flows from Africa represent about 4 percent  
of  GDP; substantially outpacing official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It is important to note that this illegal flow of money is the product of tax 
evasion made possible by mechanisms for , among others: bribery, trade misinvoicing, money 
laundering and transfer mispricing by MNCs.   The report by Donnelly (2015) documented 
that in 2012 the stock of illicit capital flows from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stood in the 
neighbourhood of 68.6 billion USD, compared to ODA and FDI that were respectively 41.1 
billion USD and 35.4 billion USD during the same interval. Asongu, S.A (2016) suggested 
that these estimates may be way lower because the real scale of illicit flows by is very nature 
is often under-reported.  
It is estimated by Fofack and Ndikumana (2010) that over the past decade, there was 
about 25 percent  of capital flight loss due to TP-related activities being reinvested in Africa, 
                                                          
2
 Whereas ‘relative pro-poor growth’ is growth that reduces inequality, ‘absolute pro-poor growth’ is one that 
reduces poverty. The former engenders sub-optimal externalities for both rich and poor households (see, Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2015a).  
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GDP would have increased by between 19 percent  and 35 percent.   Diak (2014) argued that 
if tax income lost to transfer mispricing  had been spent on health care, about 350,000 
children could have been saved every year. Mechanisms through which illicit capital flight 
and transfer mispricing contribute to underdevelopment have been substantially documented. 
Boyce and Ndikumana (2012ab) provided country-specific consequences of transfer 
mispricing whereas Nkurunziza (2012) empirically investigated relationships between illicit 
capital flows, transfer mispricing and poverty
3
.  
 
2.3 Arguments for CSR in transfer mispricing  
 
 There has always been an intense debate about CSR. More specifically, while some 
scholars argue that the concept is not relevant to business  others view it as of strategic 
importance, passing through  and  some protagonists who admit its relevance but still stress 
that it is not good for business (Asongu, J.J. 2007). In light of the above, the relevance of CSR 
to business remains an open debate. According to Asongu, J.J, CSR embodies the notion that 
organisations have the obligation to acknowledge and take into account the interest of 
employees, customers, communities, the environment and shareholders in their operations. 
Moreover, the notion of CSR is tied to sustainable development which requires corporations 
to go beyond the ‘making of profit and payment of dividends’ so as to consider the long-run 
environmental and social consequences of their operations. Hence,  such may be viewed as 
the continuous commitment by business ethics in order to contribute to socio-economic 
development through improvements in life quality  for the local community and society as a 
whole.  
 In the paragraphs that follow, we attempt to demonstrate that TP and CSR are not 
mutually exclusive. In fact their complementarity could inter alia: (i) consolidate 
shareholders’ trust, (ii) improve benefits by company employees, (iii) enhance company 
reputations, (iv) compensate for losses in investment as well as the absence of legislation in 
developing countries against transfer mispricing and (v) improve tax compliance by domestic 
companies. We  discuss the above points chronologically in five main strands. The first-three 
components are broadly consistent with Groen (2014).  
                                                          
3
 The interested reader can find more evidence  of the linkages in  a substantial bulk of the literature devoted to 
the relationships (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012ab; Weeks, 2012, 2015; Asongu, S.A., 
2013b, 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016).  
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 First, CSR from MNCs is very likely to increase shareholders’ trust. Accordingly, it is 
beneficial for shareholders if MNCs have a responsible CSR strategy. Another dimension 
from which CSR may be viewed is to conceive of it as being in the same category as 
dividends to shareholders in MNCs. In essence, the maximisation of shareholder value and 
CSR are not a contradiction because if MNCs do not engage in CSR, shareholders maybe 
doubtful of the dividends apportioned them. Moreover, in the transition for Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), MNCs with a 
substantial degree of CSR are more likely to be positively viewed by shareholders, civil 
society and multilateral development agencies.  
 Second, investments in CSR are also very likely to be profitable for MNCs. This is 
essentially because MNCs also use benefits from the social opportunities offered by the CSR 
schemes, through  among others, improvements in human resources and efficiency in 
operations (Asongu, J.J. 2007). Other mutually beneficial social amenities include healthcare, 
infrastructural development and educational institutions (Groen, 2014).  
 Third, with CSR the reputation of MNCs can also be substantial improved. In this 
light, CSR is also a kind of public relations appeal because the general public (including 
suppliers and customers) tend to view the engaging MNC in a positive light. With the 
proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs), the concern about 
corporate reputational damage is very important and hence a good track-record in CSR is a 
valuable asset in times of tax avoidance accusations and transfer mispricing. The position is 
even more relevant in societies where some MNCs’ stakeholders work and live in high-end 
tax countries.  
 Fourth, we have already substantially discussed the need for MNCs to engage in CSR 
as a form of compensation for losses in tax income by nation states from which they operate. 
Our position  on this line of inquiry is also substantiated by the fact that MNCs  profit from 
the social opportunities offered by nation states upon using taxed income from MNCs to 
provide public  goods and services. Accordingly, in the absence of tax income, welfare may 
plunge with obvious negative externalities for underlying MNCs, notably: mediocre 
education, poor health services and low public infrastructural quality owing to less 
maintenance. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that MNCs that are conscious of inherent 
transfer mispricing schemes should engage in more CSR as means of compensating for lost 
capital by nation states. Furthermore, there is an absence or lack of proper legislation against 
transfer mispricing in many developing countries. The documented challenges to formulating 
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and implementing policies against the abuse of TP include: (i) lack of resources and 
knowledge, (ii) lack of comparable standards, (iii) income  skewed by the Intellectual 
property (IP) regimes or the intangible economy to the benefit of advanced nations, (iv) lack 
of comprehensive tax treaties and (v) issues with location of savings (Asongu, S.A., 2016).  
Fifth, we further argue that CSR by multinational corporations could incite domestic 
companies to comply more willingly with their tax obligations and/or engage in similar 
activities. This position is consistent with Stiglitz who has postulated that endowing MNCs 
with breaks in taxes and implicitly given them the leeway to indulge in transfer mispricing, 
makes domestic corporations less willing to meet-up with their tax obligations: “If 
multinational companies are escaping taxation, domestic firms are put in an unfair 
competitive position and it distorts the economy” (Walsh, 2015).  
The foregoing arguments for CSR in respect of TP are also justifiable by two main 
complementary tendencies. They are:  (i) the growing strength of MNCs and (ii) increasing 
poverty levels in developing countries in which underlying MNCs operate. This is because: 
First, by the beginning of the 21
st
 century, 51 percent of the top 100 largest economies 
were MNCs, not nation states (Anderson et al., 2005). We support the narrative with five 
points. (1) According to Anderson et al., intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been 
monopolised to the height of 97 percent  by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries and 90 percent of the underlying proportion is retained by 
powerful MNCs. (2)  Developing nations which are overly reliant on agriculture have been 
left to the mercy of MNCs because: (i) twenty  of them control trade in coffee; (ii) six  
influence about 70 percent of wheat trade; (iii) two companies control approximately 80 
percent of global grain market which is also distributed by two  MNCs and (iv)  one  MNC 
has control over 98 percent of the production of packed tea. (3)  two-hundred  corporations 
constituted approximately 28 percent of the global economy. (4) The top five-hundred MNCs  
controlled 80 percent of FDI, 70 percent of global trade in commodities, about 33.3 percent of 
manufactured exports, 30 percent of global GDP and roughly 80 percent of trade in 
management and technical services. (5) The one-hundred largest corporations account for 
approximately $3400 billion worth of assets, of which 60 percent are located in foreign 
economies that is developing countries currently experiencing increasing levels of poverty.  
Second, the highlighted growing poverty in some developing countries has been 
recently confirmed by a World Bank report in April 2015 (Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 
2015). According to the report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) poverty targets, 
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poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of SSA, where 
about 45 percent of countries are still substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme 
poverty target (Asongu  & Kodila-Tedika, 2015b). This unfortunate trend substantially 
contrasts with the two decades of growth resurgence in the mid- 1990s (see Alan & Carlyn, 
2015, p. 598; Fosu, 2014, p.44). 
 
3. The Case of Glencore and Mining Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
Glencore Plc is an Anglo-Swiss MNC headquartered in Baar-Switzerland that is 
specializes in commodity trading and mining (Why Poverty, 2013; Asongu, S.A 2016). 
According to the narrative, by 2013 it was ranked among the top 10 Fortune Global 500 of the 
World’s largest companies. It is also the third largest family business in the world. 
Conversely, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been abundantly blessed 
with natural resources, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world (Daniele, 2011). 
The DRC is a nation state that is poor and at the same time rich.  
We do not wish to engage in the debate on transfer mispricing by Glencore in the DRC 
for the simple reason that it is difficult to establish such evidence. This is essentially because, 
TP regimes in Africa present a very mixed picture. In essence, according to Curtis and 
Todorova (2011), some countries have: (i) well established TP regimes (South Africa and 
Kenya); (ii) recently passed TP legislation (Uganda); (iii) tax code provisions that only 
mention TP (Algeria and Mozambique); (iv) expectations of enacting TP legislation 
(Zimbabwe and Nigeria) and (v) no TP legislation/regulation (Sudan and Libya). This 
apparent heterogeneity among nations constitutes a substantial challenge to TP policy 
harmonization across Africa. Moreover, as far as we have reviewed, TP legislation is 
currently inexistent in the DRC. This implies that Glencore can misprice without oversight 
and sanctions from national authorities. This inference is also coupled with the fact that the 
secrecy surrounding Glencore’s deals with the DRC has been estimated to tarnish the long 
term reputation of the company, essentially because shareholders might have been involved in 
corrupt practices (Global Witness, 2012).  
We discuss Glencore’s CSR in three strands, namely: a highlight on the exercise of 
TP; Glencore’s CSR and caveats to her CSR. Narratives of underlying  elements are drawn 
from an independent assessment of Glencore’s CSR activities in the DRC by three notable 
organizations:(i) Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID); (ii) BREAD for All (a 
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development foundation of the Swiss Protestant Churches) and (iii) Fastenopfer (the Catholic 
Lenten Fund is the Swiss Catholic relief agency) (Peyer et al., 2014).  
The first  aspect which highlights evidence of TP is dealt with by Glencore’s taxation 
strategy. According to Peyer et al. (2014), there has been no substantial progress in the 
domain of taxation. In essence, Glencore’s investment in community infrastructure and 
development projects should not conceal the fact this MNC is engaged in optimising its tax 
liability through the transfer of profits to microstates or tax havens. For instance, taking 
exclusively the case of Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) which is Glencore’s DRC unit, TP 
practice has cost the DRC more than 150 million USD between 2009 and 2014. This is very 
surprising given that the government of the DRC which is an indirect shareholder should not 
tolerate such transfer mispricing. Perhaps such inertia on the part of the DRC government 
may be traceable to the lack of legislation on transfer mispricing for the country’s mining 
industry.  
In the second strand, consistent with Peyer et al. (2014), since the year 2012, and more 
precisely since Glencore merged with Xstrata, the MNC has improved its CSR policies, 
notably: (i) a more detailed sustainability report; (ii) a human rights policy has been adopted; 
(iii) an application has been made for admission into the ‘Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights’ and (iv) it  has integrated the ‘International Council on Mining and 
Metals’ (ICMM). The following improvements are also noteworthy.  
First, on the ‘pollution of the Luilu River’, there has been some investment by the 
KCC in pipes and acid neutralisation systems in order to canalise ‘some of its effluent to an 
old quarry (Mupine)’ (p.115). However, contrary to the information provided by Glencore to 
the media and investors, the issue of pollution in the Luilu River remains to be resolved. 
Accordingly, the hydro-metallurgical plant is still discharging effluent (that is substantially 
contaminated with cobalt and copper) into the Luilu River.  
Second, on the ‘Basse-Kando Game Reserve’, Glencore has eventually acknowledged 
that installations at MUMI are located within the ‘Basse-Kando Game Reserve’. However, the 
MNC is still failing to engage in transparent and open negotiations with the relevant 
stakeholders, including the Ministry of Environment and the Congolese Institute for Nature 
Conservation (ICCN).  
 Third, with regard to ‘security and human rights’, Peyer et al. (2014) remarked that 
Glencore is continuously relying on police officers who often have recourse to excessive force 
and use of live ammunition to protect mines from thieves and clandestine miners. The report 
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reveals that most of the human casualties suffered near KCC concessions have neither been 
adequately investigated nor have victims (or families of victims) received compensation. The 
MNC seems to have adopted a military approach in the protection of its assets. This 
represents opportunities for the violation of human rights, especially, when Glencore’s 
security is also entitled to executing judicial police functions at MUMI and KCC.  
 Fourth, concerning communities, whereas Glencore and its DRC subsidiaries have 
employed new staff to help enhance the company’s relations with local communities, the 
measures put in place are still not enough. Moreover, the approach which had not been 
previously sanctioned by human rights has not changed substantially. According to Peyer et 
al. (2014), Glencore still lacks accountability and transparency and genuine community 
participation is not promoted. According to the authors, Glencore is not taking the necessary 
measures to reduce the negative effects of its activities on local communities, inter alia: (i) 
the resettlement of residents in Musonoi who have been most adversely affected by blasting 
and dust from the KCC open cast mine; (ii) enabling access to existing roads that are used by 
MUMI villagers and (iii) provision of drinkable water to Musonoi and Luilu.  
 Fifth, the fact that Glencore has permitted RAID, Fastenopfer and ‘Bread for All’ to 
visit its installations and sites in the DRC is an eloquent testimony that there is some dialogue 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To this end, Peyer et al. (2014) have been able 
to engage in extensive discussions and interviews with MUMI and KCC management as well 
as the representatives of Glencore in Switzerland. However, it is important to note that 
Glencore has also been threatening and exerting pressure on these NGOs. Such threats of 
legal action are viewed by Peyer et al. (2014) as manoeuvres to deflect criticism which is  
inconsistent with constructive engagement of dialogue with NGOs. 
 In the third stand, Peyer et al. (2014) concluded from their research that in spite of 
efforts devoted by Glencore towards improving its CSR in the DRC, not much has changed 
on the ground in the country. According to the authors, the company’s human rights, social 
and environmental performances are lacking in the international standards the MNC 
supposedly subscribes to. In essence, half-measures and non-transparent tactics are still being 
employed by Glencore. In summary, it is apparent from RAID, Fastenopfer and ‘Bread for 
All’ that the MNC still has to make the respect for the environment and human rights a top 
priority. It follows that CSR remains of marginal importance compared to Glencore’s 
continuous interest in minimising tax payments and maximising profits.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
This article has presented a case for transfer pricing (TP) as an argument for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). The argument has built on the position that Multinational Companies 
should be more socially responsible when they are operating in countries where the legislation 
and laws in place are not effective in  identifying and sanctioning transfer mispricing. While 
acknowledging that TP is a legal accounting practice, we have argued that in view of its 
poverty and underdevelopment externalities, the practice per se should be a solid justification 
for CSR because it is also associated with schemes that deprive developing countries from 
capital essential for investments in health, education and development programmes. 
Therefore, CSR owing to TP cannot be limited to a strategic management approach, but 
should also be considered as some kind of social justice because of associated transfer 
mispricing practices. We have further argued that CSR by multinational corporations could 
incite domestic companies to comply more willingly with their tax obligations and/or engage 
in similar activities. Whereas, traditional advocates of CSR have employed concepts such as 
reputation, licence-to-operate, sustainability, moral obligation and innovation to make the 
case for CSR, the present inquiry has extended this stream of literature by arguing that TP and 
its externalities are genuine justifications for CSR. 
 The analytical argument has consisted of the following steps. We have first described 
the  connections between transfer mispricing, extreme poverty and CSR by: (i) discussing 
transfer mispricing as the dark side of TP, (ii) explaining the link between TP and poverty and 
(iii) presenting arguments for CSR in transfer mispricing. In the second phase of the analysis, 
we have consolidated our arguments with a case study of Glencore and the mining industry in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  To this end, we have built on an independent 
assessment of Glencore’s CSR by NGOs in the DRC to confirm three main theses 
surrounding our arguments. They are:  (i) the MNC’s top priority is minimising taxes paid to 
the DRC government and maximising profits transferred to her branches in tax havens, (ii) the 
absence of a TP legislation that oversees mispricing by MNCs operating in the DRC and (iii) 
striking disparities between findings on the ground and Glencore’s efforts towards CSR which 
implies that the company still has much to invest in the DRC to compensate for lost income 
from transfer mispricing. 
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